YEAH! Alexandria's Raid, banzai! Delapenne, banzai! Zara, Pola, avenge your sister Fiume! Two QE class heads are hanged on the wall already, let's add the third one!^^
After Alexandria they never played the role they had before it anymore, and they spent almost all of the entire war under repair or in secondary tasks. So we can say that Delapenne, Bianchi and all the other ones put an end to their war sinking them in Alexandria
After Alexandria they never played the role they had before it anymore, and they spent almost all of the entire war under repair or in secondary tasks. So we can say that Delapenne, Bianchi and all the other ones put an end to their war sinking them in Alexandria
is it so difficult to recognize italian victories? We're not just "pizzapastamandolino", we show respect for other nations' heroes and victories and so we demand the same respect for ours (and I in particular require respect for the memory of my uncle-in-law Antonio Marceglia, the sinker of Queen Elizabeth)
is it so difficult to recognize italian victories? We're not just "pizzapastamandolino", we show respect for other nations' heroes and victories and so we demand the same respect for ours (and I in particular require respect for the memory of my uncle-in-law Antonio Marceglia, the sinker of Queen Elizabeth)
You know, I find this funny, that if the Japanese did it, you would call the targeted ships sunk but not for the Italians, I meant look at Pearl Harbour, everyone agrees that four battleships were sunk despite the fact that West Virginia and California coming back to service in 1944 which much longer than the damage done to HMS Valiant and HMS Queen Elizabeth.
Also, if you can't accept that the battleships being sunk, you have to agree that the Italian torpedo riders were badass for pulling off ther mission
You know, I find this funny, that if the Japanese did it, you would call the targeted ships sunk but not for the Italians, I meant look at Pearl Harbour, everyone agrees that four battleships were sunk despite the fact that West Virginia and California coming back to service in 1944 which much longer than the damage done to HMS Valiant and HMS Queen Elizabeth.
Also, if you can't accept that the battleships being sunk, you have to agree that the Italian torpedo riders were badass for pulling off ther mission
Only the loss of Arizona and Oklahoma amounted to anything really. Nevada was back before Midway, and Tennessee, West Virginia and California were there to engage Fuso and Yamashiro in 1944.
Only the loss of Arizona and Oklahoma amounted to anything really. Nevada was back before Midway, and Tennessee, West Virginia and California were there to engage Fuso and Yamashiro in 1944.
Yes but you still acknowledge that Wee Vee and California were sunk
is it so difficult to recognize italian victories? We're not just "pizzapastamandolino", we show respect for other nations' heroes and victories and so we demand the same respect for ours (and I in particular require respect for the memory of my uncle-in-law Antonio Marceglia, the sinker of Queen Elizabeth)
All the harping about "heroes and victories" doesn't change the fact that it only benefited Italy in the short term. Having brave and resourceful men doesn't matter if your leaders are all idiots.
Yes but you still acknowledge that Wee Vee and California were sunk
I don't think any respect is give to the pilots involved with that act, just the attack in general as to it being classified as a sneak attack without a declaration of war. Most people don't even notice any ships lost aside from Arizona. The rest, as far as most people are concerned, did not matter. Only Arizona mattered.
After the Raid of Alxandria, for them, there wasn't real surface action at all. With the torpedoing of the Nelson on 27 September 1941, the sinking of the Barham on 25 November 1941 and the disabling of Queen Elizabeth and Valiant on 19 december 1941, The activity of the British big guns in the Mediterranean virtually ceased. The air and submarine threat in central and east Mediterranean had become too heavy to risk them. In 1942, in the attempts to resupply Malta, British battleships sailed only few miles out of the ports in friendly waters, then leaving light cruisers and destroyers to be mauled with the merchants. A situation that didn't change until the end of the war in N. Africa and the complete depletion of the fuel of the Italian Navy.
You know, I find this funny, that if the Japanese did it, you would call the targeted ships sunk but not for the Italians,
Because the ships at Pearl Harbor actually SANK, they bottomed in the harbor and it took massive salvage efforts to raise them. Neither QE was sunk. They had significant underwater damage, but they remained floating the entire time. Valiant's damage was such that the British actually allowed the ship to photographed by the press to try and create the illusion she was still combat ready as she appeared undamaged above water and had not visibly settled much.
This isn't some double standard, it's just the facts of history failing to align with your nationalist agenda.
CJ_Spencer said:
is it so difficult to recognize italian victories? We're not just "pizzapastamandolino", we show respect for other nations' heroes and victories and so we demand the same respect for ours (and I in particular require respect for the memory of my uncle-in-law Antonio Marceglia, the sinker of Queen Elizabeth)
If you want respect that you should tell the truth instead of trying to distort history to inflate it, and I hold this opinion on ALL matters like this. The operation was effective, probably the most strategically relevant use of Frogmen anywhere during the war, but the ships were not sunk, and they were not put out of the war. The Italian frogmen were indeed one of a tiny handful of bright spots in an otherwise dismal showing by the Italian navy during the war.
CJ_Spencer said:
After Alexandria they never played the role they had before it anymore,
Yes because by the time they were repaired in early 1943 Italy was effectively finished, so there wasn't much left to do. They were around mostly performing bombardment duties, just like pretty much all the other WWI era BB too slow to operate with carriers by that point.
and they spent almost all of the entire war under repair
I was unaware that about a year and 18 months (Valiant and QE respectively) was the "entire" remaining three and half years of combat. It seems in addition to history your math skills could use work too.
or in secondary tasks.
Because Italy was defeated and there was no real use for slow battleships in the remaining active naval theater of the Pacific. The US was using it's own as glorified monitors at the same time.
So we can say that Delapenne, Bianchi and all the other ones put an end to their war sinking them in Alexandria
Sure we can say that if you're an idiot that ignores what actually happened historically.
I understood. And I'll not waste more breath in trying to make all of you italy-haters to understand what Italy and its heroes truly had been. No matter what we say or we try to demonstrate, for you we always be eternal losers. Well then, stay in your convictions, I've enough to read so much hate and insults to me, my country and my grandparents who fought and died like many other italian young boys in that war.
Tk3997 said: If you want respect that you should tell the truth instead of trying to distort history to inflate it ... The Italian frogmen were indeed one of a tiny handful of bright spots in an otherwise dismal showing by the Italian navy during the war.
That sort of value judgments have nothing historical. Historically the goals of the Italian Navy in WWII were not to chase the British Navy into the ports of Alexandria and Gibraltar, but to ensure the convoy traffic to North Africa as a main goal, and to take control of Central and East mediterranean as secondary one. The Regia Marina ensured the convoy taffic with high percentage of success until the loss of N. Africa for the Axis, and from the beginning of 1942 until the Regia Marina had fuel to burn, the British Navy was excluded from Central and East Mediterranean.
from the beginning of 1942 until the Regia Marina had fuel to burn, the British Navy was excluded from Central and East Mediterranean.
Well, that's not entirely correct.
In 1942, when things were getting right, with the Regia Marina and the Regia Aeronautica starting to work together, each time the British had to pass with a convoy, they had to either tolerate high losses, or, in a few occasions, they were forced to turn back.
So, if we talk in terms of "sea control" and "sea denial", the Regia Marina held on to the former, but about the latter... well, it tried its best, but in my opinion it didn't quite manage to reach that.
To have the control does not mean, and can't mean, to have the ability to prevent any possible enemy action. To have the control of the sky, IE, does not mean that the enemy can't try to execute a bombing. It means that such an attempt is reasonably destined to led to such losses, that it can't be performed on a regular basis. It's an "exception" to the regular course of the operations. From jan. to nov. 1942 The British presence in Central and East Mediterranean was limited to brief raids with high losses, that employed only light units, cause the risk for the major ones was judged to be too great. On the contrary, when they had fuel to burn, the Italians employed their major units, with the reasonable expectation to see them returning to ports.
Tk3997 said: Because the ships at Pearl Harbor actually SANK, they bottomed in the harbor and it took massive salvage efforts to raise them. Neither QE was sunk. They had significant underwater damage, but they remained floating the entire time. Valiant's damage was such that the British actually allowed the ship to photographed by the press to try and create the illusion she was still combat ready as she appeared undamaged above water and had not visibly settled much.
There are actually different versions ot the story. IE, naval-history.net reports that "Both QUEEN ELIZABETH and VALIANT settled on the harbour bottom on an even keel in a few feet of water", and so does www.navyhistory.org.au. Details like this are unfortunately still affected by wartime propaganda.
To have the control does not mean, and can't mean, to have the ability to prevent any possible enemy action. To have the control of the sky, IE, does not mean that the enemy can't try to execute a bombing. It means that such an attempt is reasonably destined to led to such losses, that it can't be performed on a regular basis. It's an "exception" to the regular course of the operations. From jan. to nov. 1942 The British presence in Central and East Mediterranean was limited to brief raids with high losses, that employed only light units, cause the risk for the major ones was judged to be too great. On the contrary, when they had fuel to burn, the Italians employed their major units, with the reasonable expectation to see them returning to ports.
"Regular basis" does not mean that it has to be a daily basis.
The Royal Navy knew by 1942 that attempting to send supplies through the Central Mediterranean, in either direction, would entail grievous losses, but they decided to go ahead nonetheless. Any time they decided to do that, save for a couple of occasions (in which, as I said, they had to turn back), their convoys, or what remained of them, reached their destinations.
That is not an exercise of "sea denial" on part of the Regia Marina. The only instance in which it might have achieved that could have been against Operation Vigorous, in which a convoy from Alexandria went on through heavy air attacks, but turned back when the Italian fleet was reported as sailing towards it despite air and submarine attacks.
As for the Italian use of heavy ships, they used them only on a few occasions to protect very urgent convoys, knowing well that this meant expending lots of precious fuel. Other than that, they sailed only for training in the Gulf of Taranto, or to intercept enemy forces. But they didn't directly use them for escort, and neither to patrol the waters; they knew that they were prime targets for enemy action, and if there was no chance of meeting a considerable enemy force, why risk them?
The modernized battleships were a different thing. A couple were used to escort convoys, true, but not for long, and more due to wishes from above than for actual need. And after that, they were rather quickly reduced to reserve status, to save fuel.
Dogwalker said:
There are actually different versions ot the story. IE, naval-history.net reports that "Both QUEEN ELIZABETH and VALIANT settled on the harbour bottom on an even keel in a few feet of water", and so does www.navyhistory.org.au. Details like this are unfortunately still affected by wartime propaganda.
It does not help that British damage reports are hard to come by. Perhaps they released them recently, but I'm not sure.
It does not help that British damage reports are hard to come by. Perhaps they released them recently, but I'm not sure.
Many British original documents had been unfortunately destroyed in the '50s, first than historians begun to question the "official" wartime reports (often a mix of newspaper articles and personal memoirs published during the war). So it's very difficult to extract facts from wartime propaganda, that obviously tended to minimize every loss. For example the British literature had given for decades an incredible importance to the attempts to make the two battleships look as they were undamaged. An attempt that, in fact, lasted only for few days (after which the ships were drydocked) and had been, in all likelihood, completely useless (is not like, knowing the ships had been put out of action few days before they did, the italians would have done something extraordinary). On this matter, however, there are the words of Admiral Vian. “Standing with [Cunningham] . . . on the cloudless morning after the disaster we saw, high above the harbour, a reconnaissance machine which had eluded the defences. The battleships had settled on the bed of the harbour, with submarines alongside supplying them with electric power: a photograph would reveal disaster".
"Regular basis" does not mean that it has to be a daily basis.
The Royal Navy knew by 1942 that attempting to send supplies through the Central Mediterranean, in either direction, would entail grievous losses, but they decided to go ahead nonetheless. Any time they decided to do that, save for a couple of occasions (in which, as I said, they had to turn back), their convoys, or what remained of them, reached their destinations.
With that same logic, it could be said that the German bombers hit London in 1943 any time they decided to do that. But obviously the control of the sky over Britain was of someone other. In 1942 Malta survived thanks to a pair of convoys, a part of which reached the island at cost of huge losses, several fast raids of isolated merchants that attempted to reach the island first to be spotted, and some supply carried by submarines. Infact those supplies had been enough to avoid the starving of the population and allow some activity of the air force, but many sources agree with the fact that Malta ceased to be an active base during that period. "Any time they decided to do that" was much less than what was required to mantain the activity of the base.
With that same logic, it could be said that the German bombers hit London in 1943 any time they decided to do that. But obviously the control of the sky over Britain was of someone other. In 1942 Malta survived thanks to a pair of convoys, a part of which reached the island at cost of huge losses, several fast raids of isolated merchants that attempted to reach the island first to be spotted, and some supply carried by submarines. Infact those supplies had been enough to avoid the starving of the population and allow some activity of the air force, but many sources agree with the fact that Malta ceased to be an active base during that period. "Any time they decided to do that" was much less than what was required to mantain the activity of the base.
It's not just a matter of logic, it's also a matter of significance.
Raids on British territory by then had a little military value; they might have had a significance had morale been low, and therefore as a psychological weapon to knock the UK out of the war (but we know this was not the case).
The Malta convoys were a different matter altogether. Malta, for better or for worse, was given a very high priority, and therefore the losses that could be accepted while planning and executing them were definitely on another scale.
Not to mention, especially, the resources. Sure, the roughly 500 bombers employed in the "Baby Blitz" are nothing to be laughed at, but I think that the ships and aircrafts thrown for the Malta convoys were proportionally of more value.
As for starving the Maltese population... well, I recently read numbers that made me think that this was not exactly a priority. Although Malta had to endure, after May 1942, a diet of only 1500 calories (comparatively worse than the Italian one, according to ISTAT sources), both the convoys of the Second Battle of Sirte and Operation Harpoon dedicated most of its volume to war supplies and coal, leaving only from 10 to 15% to foodstuff, medical supplies and various other things. Also, sometimes it's mentioned a "target date" of around September 1942, but it was not the date when the food would have run out, just merely the date on which horses and goats would have to be killed. It also seems that the defensive stocks of the islands were still far from running out. On June 1942 the AA ammunition was still around 6000 tons (it had been double that on December 1941, so the usage was not that high); therefore what was sent was destined more to ensure the offensive capabilities of the base rather than defending it.
And you lost me there. I have nothing but respect for Italy and its people. I have no respect for Mussolini and his goons, who got themselves and their country in over their heads.
It's not just a matter of logic, it's also a matter of significance.
In both cases it was largely a matter of pride. Malta had been an active and important base in 1941 to counter the Axis convoys to N.Africa, but, after the destruction of Force K on 19 dec. 1941, it become more a liability than an asset for the British. It's survival draining much of the Mediterranean Fleet resouces for little gain. When the siege was finally lifted, in nov. 1942, Operation Torch had completely changed the strategic situation, and the island had already lost all of its strategic value, being both too exposed and too far from the new routes of the Axis convoys. Force K was reestablished on the island at the end of the year, only to be transferred to Algeria a month later.
And you lost me there. I have nothing but respect for Italy and its people. I have no respect for Mussolini and his goons, who got themselves and their country in over their heads.
Scary as expected!!A "MAIALE" MANNED TORPEDO!?EEEH!?You are the Italian heavy cruisers, are you not?NOOO!?I wonder if they're ships that I met in the War...Hey girls! Aquila's finally here!They've scarpered.THIS WAY, ZARA NEE-SAMA! HURRY!Her comrades were sunk by Maiales.I'm the Queen Elizabeth Class Battleship, Warspite.Wait... they're changing into diving suits...?Struck down by a Maiale.
Aquilia was partially scuttled by divers from the former Decima Flottiglia MAS.Italians are strong soldiers, if their number is 11 or less.
