Probably near the start of the "First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal", November 13, 1942.
Atlanta was leading the formation of U.S. cruisers and thus one of the first ships to make contact with the Japanese. Helena was fourth in line. Although the radar on Helena and Atlanta picked up the Japanese ships, the U.S. commander (who was on the San Francisco, which had less effective radar) hesitated giving the command to open fire. There was a lot of confusion. Fletcher was bringing up the rear of the U.S. formation, so she had very little idea what was happening.
Probably near the start of the "First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal", November 13, 1942.
Atlanta was leading the formation of U.S. cruisers and thus one of the first ships to make contact with the Japanese. Helena was fourth in line. Although the radar on Helena and Atlanta picked up the Japanese ships, the U.S. commander (who was on the San Francisco, which had less effective radar) hesitated giving the command to open fire. There was a lot of confusion. Fletcher was bringing up the rear of the U.S. formation, so she had very little idea what was happening.
And then there's the part where Fletcher got really pissed off at a lack of direction, broke formation, and performed 2 drive-by torpings on the melee, one headed up, and one headed back. There's also the whole thing of her getting really ticked during the Battle of Tassafaronga when the Task Force Commander insisted that they were out of range of Japanese torpedoes while still having the Japanese in range of their torpedoes. To be quite honest, being a US destroyer captain in a night action before the Battle of Vella Gulf was very much a suffering experience since there was a very good chance you knew more than the Task Force Commander but still had to ask his permission to do the right thing and by the time you got it, it was already too late.
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